I had no idea this issue had been identified. While I find this tool very useful, the project is seeming rather questionable to me now.
I had no idea this issue had been identified. While I find this tool very useful, the project is seeming rather questionable to me now.
It matters because nobody is going to check the hashes for all of the files match whenever there’s a change so the maintainer can just replace them with whatever he wants.
that’s what automation is for - nobody is going to manually check them, but anyone is able to automatically set something up to check their hashes in change… the fact that it’s possible that anyone is doing that now that it’s a known issue perhaps makes it less problematic as an attack vector
That is true, but also nobody is doing it. Just like nobody is verifying Signal’s “reproducible builds”.
are you sure?
there could be thousands just waiting for a failure to come out and say “HEY THIS IS DODGY”
Yea because I tested it myself. Nobody else seems to care, and if they did, I would think there would be a public way to see regular test results regardless.
I know this exists for some projects, but somehow nothing privacy-sensitive
Is that any different from no one checking the code every update?
The amount of malware you can cram in a source-code patch without drawing attention vs. in a binary is vastly different.
There’s also the fact that if you want to ship binaries, you can just wget them from source during the build process. Not a perfect solution but much better than what’s ventoy doing. The source code updates works the same in every project because it has to. That’s why this is drawing more attention.
That’s ok if we are talking about malware publicly shown in the published source code… but there’s also the possibility of a private source-code patch with malware that it’s secretly being applied when building the binaries for distribution. Having clean source code in the repo is not a guarantee that the source code is the same that was used to produce the binaries.
This is why it’s important for builds to be reproducible, any third party should be able to build their own binary from clean source code and be able to obtain the exact same binary with the same hash. If the hashes match, then you have a proof of the binary being clean. You have this same problem with every single binary distribution, even the ones that don’t include pre-compiled binaries in their repo.
The problem is not near enough projects support reproducible builds, and many that do aren’t being regularly verified, at least publicly.